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The United Nations decision to seat the Peoples Republic of China,
coupled with the departure of the Chinese Nationalist Government from that
world organization, has increased the hopes and prospects of the Formosan
nationalism movement for an independent Taiwan. During the decade of the
1970's, barring unforeseen international events, it appears the present
Nationalist government will have to reach an accommodation with either the
Communist government on the mainland or the native Formosan people on
Taiwan. The purpose of this study is to examine the historic, legal and
present prospects of a Formosan nationalism or independence movement, and
to attempt to determine the impact of this movement on the future status of
Taiwan. The information and data have been obtained from recognized Formo-
san scholars as well as personal impressions gained between 1966-1970 while
serving in the Far East and dealing directly with members of the Government
of the Republic of China and the Formosan community.
Throughout this study the term "Republic of China" is used to refer
to the present Chiang Kai-shek government, while "Formosa" and "Taiwan"
refer to the island itself, including the Pescadores, Quemoy, and the Matsu
Island groups in the Straits of Formosa.
Mark A. Plummer, "Taiwan's Chinese Nationalist Government," CliAJiZilt




The physical aspect of Formosa presents a subtropical island about
240 miles long and 85 miles across at its widest point, with an area of 14, 000
square miles, approximately one-half the size of Massachusetts. It lies 120
miles off the coast of southeastern China's Fukien province. The island's
population of 14. 5 million is larger than that of most countries now represented
in the United Nations; it is larger than that of Australia, Sweden, Chile, and
almost double that of Greece. Of this figure, over 12 million inhabitants are
native to Formosa, and 2 million are post- 1945 Nationalist settlers from the
Chinese mainland.
While it is uncertain when and whence the first inhabitants came to
Formosa, it is known that the Chinese began to migrate there in substantial
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numbers in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, with extensive
movement across the Taiwan Straits in the mid- seventeenth century during
the Ch'ing (Manchu) dynasty. Emigrants then were principally Fukienese
and Hakkas (the latter mostly from Kwangtung province). * In 1662, the son of
a famous Ming pirate known as Koxinga (Cheng Ch'eng--Kung) led a refugee
band across the Formosa Straits, expelling Dutch traders and making Formosa
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his personal kingdom. This is significant in that many Formosans consider
Koxinga the creator of the first independent state on Formosa and refer to
his regime as "the first and only time the island was independent of foreign
control .... In 1633 the descendents of Koxinga were finally forced to
surrender to the Manchu forces and in July, 1683 Formosa was absorbed into
the Chinese Empire.
From 1683 until the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the native
Formosans were under the weak control of the Manchu dynasty from the main-
land capital of Peking. Western observers on Formosa before 1895 reported
that laws and security measures were neither enforced by the Manchus nor '
accepted by the natives. The Chinese administrators found it dangerous to
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venture beyond the island's few garrison towns. The popular opposition to the
Manchus was particularly intense in Formosa and resulted in large-scale
rebellions in 1721, 1787, and 1870. Whether the many revolts of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries signified a growing native identity is doubtful. Most
writers seem to think they were a negative resistance to external rule rather
than a sign of positive Formosan nationalism.
On March 26, 1895, in the course of the Sino-Japanese War, the
Japanese captured the Pescadores Islands after brief resistance from the
Douglas Mendel, The VotltlcA 0& Fosuno&cm hlatLonaZLim (Berkeley:
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Chinese. Following a three-week armistice, a peace treaty was signed at
Shimonoseki, providing for the cession to Japan of Formosa. Shortly after
the occupation, there were recurrences of Formosan "banditry" and sporadic
uprisings, some of which were ruthlessly suppressed by the Japanese.
When Formosa was taken over by the Japanese government in 1895,
it could be described as a "traditional society. " Within a few years after
assuming control, Japan made this society the subject of a vigorous develop-
mental policy aimed at transforming the island into a productive agricultural
colony. However, it was first necessary to establish civil order, build addi-
tional communications, and to organize monetary, marketing and other basic
economic institutions. Japan set about these tasks on a priority basis, and
its colonial administrators carried them out efficiently on an accurate time
schedule. While the motive was definitely self-interest, Japan's policies were
o
enlightened. Japan sought to demonstrate it was a civilizing force in Asia.
During the 1920's, Japan strove to build hydro- electric plants in the
Formosan mountains and an irrigation system for the southeastern plains. In
addition, by the early 1940's over 90 per cent of the Formosan children were
enrolled in a six-year free and compulsory school, with about 70 per cent of
the people literate in Japanese as well as their own language. 9 Most Formosan
7












industries reached prewar peaks of output in 1938 or 1939, after which a num-
ber of forces combined to bring about sharp declines. More and more of the
island's economic resources were mobilized to support the Japanese war
effort and with the mounting of the U. S. offensive in the Pacific, Taiwan was
the target of increased Allied bombing attacks.
Most writers in this field seem to agree that the Japanese regime
naturally did its best to suppress, subvert, or disrupt any Formosan national-
ism movement, and political freedom under their rule did not keep pace with
economic, public health and educational developments. However, Formosans
appear to have realized that the half-century of Japanese rule had prepared
the ground for a genuine sense of national unity. It had provided the first
effective island-wide administration, instituted modern education, cut off most
ties with mainland China, and increased the growth of urbanization. This
growth, along with the rise of an articulate middle class, helped weld the
Formosan population together at the same time the irritant of the Japanese





LEGAL ASPECTS OF FORMOSA
A study of Formosan nationalism would be incomplete without exam-
ining the views and claims concerning the present legal status of Formosa
since World War II. Since nearly all the conferences and decisions affecting
this status took place during the time frame I have now reached in this chronol-
ogy of Formosan nationalism, I would like to stop here and examine in detail
some of these legal aspects.
The basis of the post-war status of Formosa was determined by the
Cairo Declaration of December, 1943, wherein President Roosevelt, Prime
Minister Churchill, and President Chiang Kai-shek agreed that, "All terri-
tories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and
1 9
the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China.
The Cairo Declaration was the first joint declaration by the United
States, Great Britain, and China in respect to the future status of Formosa.
With the exception of Russia, the Allied Powers had agreed to restore the
island to the Republic of China. That a commitment was made to China by
her Allies is unquestioned. However, the legal binding effects of the Cairo
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Because Russia was riot at war with Japan at the time of the Cairo
Conference, Marshal Stalin did not participate in its first phase. Asa result,
Russia was not a signatory to the Declaration of 1943. However, during a
discussion with President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill at the time
of the Teheran Conference, Marshal Stalin concurred with the substance of
the Cairo Declaration. 14 While wishing to maintain an atmosphere of coopera-
tion with its allies, and agreeing in principle to the substance of the Cairo
Declaration, Russia was not bound to the Declaration since it was not a signa-
tory to that pact.
As a result of the American Government's efforts to obtain Soviet
acceptance of the Cairo Declaration, its terms were reiterated in the Postdam
Proclamation. The Proclamation, issued on July 26, 1945, and approved by
the Heads of Government of the United States, China and Great Britain, called
for the surrender of Japan. Paragraph (8) of the Proclamation specified that:
"The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out. " 15
Contrary to American expectations the Soviet Government did not
become a signatory to the Potsdam Proclamation. In justifying his actions,
Stalin claimed that Russia was still at peace with Japan. Furthermore, the
Soviet leader was reluctant to commit himself until the Allies agreed to his
demands and until Russia had settled its problems with China. However, when
14
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8the Allied victory over Japan appeared imminent, Russia declared war on
that nation. In a statement handed to the Japanese Ambassador and published
in the Soviet Press on August 8, 1945, Foreign Minister Molotov declared:
Taking into consideration the refusal of Japan to surrender,
the Allies approached the Soviet Government with a proposal
to join the war against Japanese aggression .... Faithful
to its obligations to its Allies, the Soviet Government accepted
the proposal of the Allies and adhered to the statement of the
Allied Powers of July 26, 1945 . . . (Potsdam Proclamation).
As of 9 August, the Soviet Union will consider it is in a state
of war with Japan. °
That, declaring war against Japan, the Soviet Union also agreed to
adhere to the terms of the Cairo Declaration is a matter of history. Most
significant is the fact that the remaining Allied Powers have not yet agreed
to the restoration of Formosa to the Republic of China.
Although the Instrument of Surrender, signed on September 2, 1945,
did not specifically refer to Formosa, it stipulated complete compliance with
the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation. Accordingly, the Japanese
forces on the island surrendered to the Nationalist Government which assumed
administrative control of the government. Although Japan did not formally
transfer title to China, it no longer exercised any control over the territory.
The Japanese acceptance of the Instrument of Surrender, though it




territory to China. Sovereignty in law remained with Japan until it formally
renounced title to the island in 1952. The Japanese renunciation has further
complicated the issue. In addition to the claims of Communist China, the
position of the Nationalist Government has also been challenged by the native
Formosans. They claim the Cairo Declaration is not valid, as it violates the
Atlantic Charter. The basis for the violation is the fact the Declaration handed
1 7Formosa to China without the consent of the Formosan people. This argu-
ment appears questionable since as noted earlier the Cairo Declaration did
not transfer title of the island from Japan to China. They also claim that the
predominantly Chinese ethnic origin of the population does not necessarily make
them Chinese and that long political separation from China and misrule by the
Chinese authorities have given them the right to self-determination. Since
they consider the present status of Formosa as undetermined, they have asked
for complete independence in accordance with the principle and practice of
self-determination under the provisions of Article I of the United Nations
Charter which states as one of its purposes: "To develop friendly relations
among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples. " Pursuing this argument, the spokesmen for
independence petitioned the United Nations to intervene in their behalf. *-°
17
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Prior to departing from the United Nations the Republic of China refused to
discuss the issue on the grounds that the problem is an internal matter. As
such, intervention by third parties would be a direct violation of Section 7,
Article 2, of the United Nations Charter which states in part:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize
the United Nations to intervene in matters which are
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.
However, the withdrawal of the Republic of China from the United Nations
casts doubt on the practicality of the above argument.
In concluding the question of legality of claims to Formosa, the
Republic of China contends that the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Pro-
clamation are "legal and binding upon the signatories. 9 They are adamant
in their opinion that title to Formosa has passed to China and. the island is an
integral part of Chinese territory. In support of his Government's position on
the subject, President Chiang Kai-shek declared:
Therefore, when Japan surrendered, the Government of
the Republic of China repossessed Taiwan (Formosa) and
Penghu (Pescadores) and constituted them as Taiwan Pro-
vince. Since that time, Taiwan and Penghu have regained
their status as an integral unit of the territory of the
Republic of China. 20
Republic of China News Conference, MJ/UA&UJ 0& Tr0h.2A.QVl k^OAJU,
,
October 16, 1959, p. 1.
20
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The Formosans contend that the Nationalist Government forfeited
its right to represent China when it failed to defeat the Chinese Communists on
the mainland. Pursuing this line of argument they have questioned the right of
21Chiang Kai-shek to establish the seat of his government on the island. How-
ever, it might be argued that the continuous exercise of governmental authority
and occupation of Formosa for over twenty years has established possession of
Formosa by the Nationalist Government by an assertion of right.
In August, 1945 when Chiang Kai-shek accepted the Japanese sur-
render of Taiwan an "Administrator General and Concurrent Supreme Com-
mander in the Taiwan Area" was established. This action virtually restored
to Chiang the territory pledged in the Cairo Declaration, at least for de facto
rule. De jure adherence by Japan through formal renunciation of all claims
came with the general peace treaty of September, 1951 and a separate bilateral
treaty concluded with the Republic of China in April, 1952. However, no de
jure sovereignty was thereby awarded to the Republic of China, since no bene-
ficiary was named to receive what Japan had renounced. Failure to resolve
this legal dilemma twenty years ago continues to haunt those who argue today
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The initial reaction to Chinese control following Japan's surrender
indicated the decision at Cairo had been well-founded. Even active Formosan
Nationalists admit today that on the whole the Taiwanese people originally
9 o
welcomed the Nationalist administration. "If we had been given a vote
in 1945, we probably would have approved Chinese rule, " said Dr. Thomas
Liao in 1963. Other Formosans, too, admit to their "glorified image of China
and the Chinese. " It was only after the Nationalist government proved it-
self objectionable on Formosa that the native islanders arose in revolt.
The first soldiers arriving were illiterate, undisciplined, and
treated the Formosans as an occupied people. ^ Their leader and governor
was General Chen Yi, former governor of Fukien province, who soon surrounded
himself with other mainland officers who acted as commissioners to control
the island economy. These mainland leaders governed Formosa as an
occupied territory, not as a liberated Chinese province. They resented the
local population, partly because it had prospered under Japanese rule, and
tended to regard the Formosans, who had adopted the customs and culture of
Japan, more as enemies than fellow countrymen.
23
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Following the first group of mainlanders came their friends and
relatives, followed by "waves of coolies brought from the diseased and illiter-
ate masses of Shanghai slums . . . bubonic plague and cholera appeared on
Formosa in 1946 for the first time in thirty years. "^ '
General Chen Yi and his associates lost no time in beginning to re-
organize the Japanese enterprises into a system of officially operated monop-
olies. It is estimated that at least 90 percent of all economic enterprises on
9 o
the island were thus brought under government control. The economic
collapse of Formosa was the most serious consequence of the first eighteen
months of Chinese rule. Where widespread corruption had been unfamiliar,
it now ranged from thievery of private homes to looting of factories, and mas-
sive diversion of Formosan goods and left-over Japanese supplies back to the
mainland black market.
Three announcements made by the Government in 1946 arousing
bitter resentment were: (1) a decision prohibiting local self-government by
Formosans until 1949 (two years later than the mainland provinces); (2) an
announcement that former Japanese-owned real estate would be sold at auction
to favored mainlanders; and (3) the placing of all external trade and most pro-
duction in the hands of a few mainlander officials.
27








Perhaps in these circumstances, it was natural that the Formosans
should be disposed to magnify the responsibility of Chinese officials for the
deplorable economic plight of the island and to overlook the effects of allied
bombings and the wartime neglect of the island's civilian economy by Japan.
In addition, the repatriation of 300, 000 Japanese included many skilled techni-
cians. Nevertheless, such was the background of the violent clash which took
place in the second year of the Chinese occupation.
On the evening of February 27, 1947, Chinese agents of the Tobacco
Monopoly walked through a crowded Taipei park and seized an elderly woman
vendor selling unlicensed cigarettes. When those nearby came to her defense,
several shots were fired, setting off riots and a general attack on the occupa-
tion authorities by the Formosans, both in Taipei and elsewhere on the island. y
Martial law was declared. A Settlement Committee was formed by the Formo-
sans, and General Chen Yi, who then lacked the necessary military forces to
cope with a revolt, adopted a temporizing attitude and accepted in principle to
initiate a series of political and economic reforms.
However, Chen Yi had secretly communicated with Nanking and
requested Chiang Kai-shek to send troops to Taiwan to strengthen his hand. ^"
The Formosan Settlement Committee submitted their reform proposals on







political reforms in this province are very proper. The Central Government
will not take any military actions against Taiwan . . . "31 That same evening
troops of the Chinese 21st Division, Shanghai, landed to quell the uprising.
They carried American and Japanese equipment as they began a month-long
retaliatory massacre. The Formosan Settlement Committee was disbanded
and the Government forces rounded up all Formosans suspected of having been
involved in the revolt, including a substantial proportion of the Taiwanese
intellectuals and elite. Estimates of the total number of Formosans killed in
1947 range from 10, 000 to 20, 000 if one counts prisoners presumed dead and
those disappeared. °
Many Formosans today claim that these events were the catalyst in
causing the Taiwanese activists to move from the advocacy of reform of the
Chiang Kai-shek government to advocacy of Formosan independence.
After order had been restored the Chinese Defense Minister was
sent from Nanking to investigate the uprising and reported "the revolt was due
to the instigation of Communists, the training of the Japanese, and the ambi-













in this country; W. G. Goddard, writing in 1966 blamed the Japanese and
OK
Formosan politicians as much as General ChenYi.
After receiving a report from the United States Ambassador at
Nanking concerning the deplorable state of affairs in Formosa, the Generalis-
simo relieved General Chen Yi of his post and transferred him to the favored
position of governor of Chiang's own home province of Chekiang. In fact,
Chen Yi was not punished until he was discovered to be in contact later with
the Communists on the mainland, presumably with intentions of dealing with
o c
them. He was condemned by Chiang Kai-shek in mid-1950 and executed for
his crimes in Taiwan from 1945-1947. This belated execution did not convince
the Formosans that it was for any misdeeds committed on Taiwan. They were
quite skeptical, noting that Chen Yi had been rewarded quite handsomely by
Chiang and that he had been arrested only when it was discovered that he was
about to betray his friend and patron, the Generalissimo.
By mid- 1948 it was evident that the Nationalists would be swept out
of North China. "' Chiang soon lost the great postwar advantages given him
with United States logistics and moral support, by insisting on holding walled
cities while the Communists controlled the countryside and soon isolated his
positions. In December, 1949, the Nationalist government withdrew to
35
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Formosa with the remnant of its armed forces and loyal mainland supporters.
Asa result, the fortunes and future status of the Formosan people remained
until today inextricably enmeshed with the foreign policy of the United States
and China, as well as the foreign and internal policy of their own country.
The initial policy of the United States was that Taiwan belonged to
China, and stressing the determination of avoiding embroilment in Chinese
internal affairs, President Truman announced on January 5, 1950:
. . . The United States will not pursue a course which
will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China.
Similarly, the United States Government will not pro-
vide military aid to the Chinese forces on Formosa.
In the view of the United States Government, the
resources on Formosa are adequate to enable them to
obtain the items which they consider necessary for the
defense of the island .... 38
President Truman's policy statement plunged Formosan leaders into
despair. For the second time since Japan's surrender, the United States let
pass an opportunity to perhaps intervene on behalf of the Formosan people.
Following the President's speech, Secretary of State Acheson made an address
which defined a defense perimeter for American interests in the Western
Pacific that excluded Korea and Taiwan.
The President's statement was bitterly attacked by the Republican
opposition in Congress. Senator Taft said that the rejection of the idea of
38
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American armed forces stopping the advance of Communism in the Far East
was inconsistent with that which the United States had agreed to do in Europe. °
Senator Vandenburg observed that "The rights of the Formosan people them-
selves must be consulted ..."
In New York the Soviet Union moved to expel the Nationalist Chinese
from the United Nations, but China's delegate was at that moment chairman of
the Security Council, and the Russian motion was defeated. The Russians sub-
sequently walked out of the Council on January 11, 1950.
The United States' position did not waver publicly from its view that
Formosa belonged to China until June 27, 1950, two days after the North Korean
Communist forces attacked the Republic of Korea. At this time, President
Truman issued a statement which heralded a significant shift in American
policy:
... In these circumstances the occupation of Formosa by
Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security
of the Pacific area and to the United States forces perform-
ing their lawful and necessary functions in that area . . .
Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent
any attack on Formosa . . . .
The following day Chou En-lai made the Communist Chinese position clear
with the following immediate reaction to Truman's statement:
39
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I declare that Truman's statement of June 27 and the
action of the American Navy constitute armed agres-
sion against the territory of China. I declare that . . .
the fact that Taiwan is part of China will remain un-
changed forever. ^1
President Truman's action amounted to a moratorium on Formosa,
but did not explicitly recognize the Chiang regime's sovereignty over the
island; nor did he accept Chiang's offer on June 29, 1950, of 33, 000 troops to
42help in Korea. By February, 1951 (three months after the Chinese Com-
munists intervened in Korea), substantial United States military aid was
arriving in Taiwan.
Throughout the Korean Conflict the position of the United States
became more firm, and in May of 1951, Dean Rusk, then Assistant Secretary
of State for Far Eastern Affairs stated: "We recognize the National Govern-
ment of the Republic of China even though the territory under its control is
severely restricted. We believe it more authentically represents the views of
the great body of the people of China . . . "43 This statement was interpreted
by many as the equivalent of an announcement that the United States was un-
qualifiedly supporting the National Government of China.
The promotion of independence for Taiwan during this time frame
would have been difficult for the United States. It would have to have been
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pursued in the face of stubborn opposition from the Chinese Communists,
from Chiang's supporters in the United States and probably would have required
the forcible elimination of the Chiang government.
The question of the status of the off-shore islands became an acute
problem for the United States in 1954, when the Chinese Communists bom-
barded Quemoy Island followed by an amphibious assault and the fall of Ichiang
Island on January 18, 19 55. During this period a mutual defense treaty was
signed between the United States and the Republic of China (December 2, 1954)
that is still in effect today. This treaty was described at the time as an inte-
gral part of our defense strategy based on the "island chain in the Western
Pacific. " It will present one of the primary problems the United States must
encounter in scaling down or dissolving our military commitment to Taiwan,
should we so choose.
In October, 1958, after a three-day conference with United States
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles on the off-shore islands crisis, Chiang
Kai-shek renounced the use of force for the recovery of the mainland. In
June, 1962, in order to allay mounting tension in the Taiwan straits, President
John F. Kennedy stressed United States opposition to the use of force by both
Communists and Nationalists.
During the 1950-60 period the U. S. economic and military aid
continued to increase, finally reaching 3 billion dollars in economic and over
2 billion dollars in military assistance. Even today, critics of the
44
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National Government contend that the military expenditures and buildup go far
beyond that needed for defense alone. Formosa has the unenviable distinction
of having proportionally more people under arms than any other country.
Today, 90 per cent of the 400, 000 ground troops are Fcrmosan (Fox Butterfield
writing for the New York Times , 12 October 1969, reported that the highest
Formosan officer in the armed forces was a major and that only 86 of 14, 000
majors are Formosan). However they may feel about Chiang's vows to "re-
conquer the mainland, " the military will certainly oppose any Chinese Commun-
ist attack. There is no incentive on their part to change one mainland rule for
another.
During the Kennedy-Nixon presidential campaign of 1960, Senator
Kennedy questioned the wisdom of the United States position of supporting
Chiang's retention of the offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. However,
when accused by Nixon and others of "softness" toward Communist China, he
45drew back from advocacy of any offshore island disengagement. Throughout
the 1960's, the role of the Formosan people remained unchanged within their
own country, while the admission of Communist China to the world community
moved closer. Finally, in late 1971 the Peoples Republic of China was seated
in the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations, replacing
the Republic of China. This was followed in early 1972 with increased contact
and communications between Communist China and the United States, culminat-





break with Tokyo on September 29, 1972.
Following these international developments, the prospect of Formo-
san independence seems to have improved in the eyes of the Taiwanese in
exile in Japan and this country. Before further examining this prospect, I
would like first to briefly discuss the existing government structure and leader-
ship on the Island: Taipei has been the "temporary" capital since the Commun-
ist victory on the mainland in 1949. Chiang and his ruling party, the Kuomin-
tang (KMT) maintain they are upholding the traditions of Sun Yat-sen and the
Revolution of 1911 which overthrew the last Chinese dynasty and established
the Republic. Since Sun's death in 1925, Chiang has headed the KMT and
except for a few months, has continuously served as head of the government.
The organizational structure of the Kuomintang, also known as the Nationalist
Party, is similar to that of Communist parties. This is not really surprising
since Sun Yat-sen modelled the KMT on the Russian Communist Party.
Elected as the Republic of China's first President under the new
constitution of 1947, Chiang resigned in 1949 as his mainland government was
collapsing, but he resumed the presidency on Taiwan in 1950. When the seat
of the government of the Republic of China was moved to Taiwan, much of the
government apparatus, designed to rule all of China, was focused upon the
island. Members of the National Assembly and the Legislative Yuan (branch)
46




who had been elected on the mainland in 1947 and 1948 ruled Taiwan, the only-
area remaining under their jurisdiction. Less than five per cent of the govern-
ment officials were native Taiwanese. When the legislators' terms were due to
expire in the early 1950' s, their powers were extended indefinitely pending the
47liberation of the mainland.
Chiang was reelected President by remnants of the National Assembly
when his six-year term was completed in 1954. In spite of his insistence that
no changes should be made in the 1947 constitution pending the recovery of the
mainland, alterations were made in the " temporary provisions " of the consti-
tution to allow Chiang to be reelected beyond two terms in 1960. In February,
1972, he announced he would again run for office and was elected without
opposition for his fifth term.
While maintaining complete control of national and international
affairs, the government promoted the establishment of a Taiwan Provincial
Assembly in 1959. Although the provincial governor continues to be appointed
by the national government, the Assembly is popularly elected and has broad
domestic powers. Many Formosan city and county officials are also elected in
highly contested elections. Independent candidates are often elected as mayors
of the major cities. Martial law remains in partial effect, and elective officials
dare not challenge certain national goals such as the "return to the mainland. "
The national government which wishes to maintain the image and some





attrition of its elected officials. In 1972 after a freeze. in office of more than
25 years, membership in all elected bodies had been greatly reduced and
less than a majority of the original members (appointed in 1947) remained. To
check this trend, national elections were held December 23, 1972, in Taiwan,
the only "liberated area. "
Although there is no specific statute to exclude Formosan citizens
and their representatives from the overall fictional government of China, this
has in effect been the past policy. However, in 1972, a large majority of the
National Assembly and Legislators elected were Formosans. This increase in
representation has encouraged the native islanders but still leaves them with
less than a 20 per cent representation. The election did not affect incumbent
legislators who are to hold their seats until a "return to the mainland" brings
their constituencies back under National control. Newly elected holders of
office will have to stand for re-election on a regular basis. Despite the small
proportion of overall representation, there has been an explicit effort to
increase Formosan participation in the political system. ^° In the 1972
elections, voter turnout was encouraged and nearly 7. 5 million or over 70 per
cent participated. For the first time, open criticism of the Chiang regime by
some of the candidates --tolerated by the government- -was wholly unprecedented.
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Legislation and attrition have also improved the position of the For-
mosans in areas such as the civil service. In the early 1950' s only about half
of those taking examinations were native Formosans, but in the last two years
the figure has risen to approximately 92 per cent, with over 90 per cent
49passing. *a
In other functions of civil government such as public health, welfare,
the police system, transportation and agriculture, the Formosans have
dominated the majority of the lower and middle levels of management, but still
achieve little representation in the higher executive positions.
A similar pattern exists in the school system, with the senior
teachers and principals of the middle and elementary schools remaining main-
landers, as is the case for virtually all university professors (with the notable
50
exception of medicine).
In contrast to the mainlanders in better governmental and official
positions, the Formosans control most of the better paying jobs in the private
sector, and make up nearly all of the middle class merchants and agricultural
workers.
While mainlanders dominate the political system, explicit and not
insignificant steps are being taken to increase Formosan participation.
Changes in the status of Chiang Ching-kuo, eldest son of President Chiang
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Kai-shek, give further indications of his preparation for eventual supreme
leadership. Now age 62, Ching-kuo has served his apprenticeship as head of
the Youth Corps, the Veterans Bureau, the security agencies, Minister of
National Defense and Vice Premier.
In June of 1972, Ching-kuo was appointed Premier and his old post
of Vice Premier was allocated to a Taiwanese. In addition, three more Tai-
wanese were appointed to high level Government positions previously held by
mainlanders. If President Chiang should step aside, Vice President Yen Chia-
kan could become President, but because the constitution is vague, the premier-
ship could become more powerful and the presidency more ceremonial. ^*
In 192 5, Ching-kuo traveled to the Soviet Union for study, apparently
with his father's blessing. He attended Moscow's Sun Yat-sen University and
various political and military schools and, apparently against his father's will,
he remained in Russia for 13 years, marrying a Russian. He later emerged in
Taiwan as a tough and shrewd administrator. He shows proper deference to
his elders, and is popular with the soldiers, as well as flexible in dealing with
52
the Taiwanese majority.
Arrests and convictions for political offenses have continued, and
are common occurrences. Chen Yu-hsi, a former student at the University of
Hawaii, received a seven-year prison sentence for reading Communist
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material as part of his school work while in Hawaii. 5 ^ Soon afterwards, a
32 year old Formosan doctor who had been conducting research in Japan was
given a 15-year sentence for allegedly being a Formosan independence leader. 5 ^
It is understandable that there is no effectively organized Formosan independ-
ence movement on Taiwan. It is centered in Japan and the United States with
offices in Canada and France. Supporting the movement abroad makes it
impossible for a Formosan to return home in safety. Of the many Formosan
students that study abroad, few have any intentions of returning. In all, a
large per cent of the students who come to the United States remain perman-
ently. 55
The first overseas organization for Formosans was in Hong Kong in
1948, formed by Joshua Liao who with his brother, Thomas, fled the 1947
massacre discussed earlier in this study. Thomas Liao (Liao Wen-i) created
the Formosan Independency Party upon his 1950 arrival in Tokyo. He
remained the exiled leader until 196 5, when he defected back to the Chiang
government and received amnesty. The present leader of the Formosan
independence movement is Professor Peng Ming-min.
In September, 1964, Peng was chairman of the Political Science
Department at the National Taiwan University. The previous year Chiang Kai-
shek had honored him as one of ten "outstanding young people, " and in 1961 he









served at the United Nations as a member of the Chinese delegation, a unique
opportunity for a Taiwanese. In 1964 Peng and two assistants composed a
"Declaration of Taiwanese Independence" and in the process of printing it were
arrested and sentenced to eight years in prison. After admitting his "wrong-
doings" he was released after thirteen months, and placed under close surveil-
lance. Despite this he escaped the island to Sweden and later the United States
and is now teaching at the University of Michigan.
Peng has developed into the most promising and respected Formosan
political leader of the post-war era. If he can survive the end of the Republic
of China's rule on Taiwan, he stands an excellent chance of becoming a future
leader of Formosa.
Recent activities of the independence movement have included the
merger of five of the world-wide organizations into one "World United Formo-
sans for Independence, " headquartered in the United States.
Peng Ming-min, A laktz. ofa Freedom: MemcuAi o& a fohmo&an Indtpznd-
tnce. IzadQA (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1972), p. 136.

VFORMOSA'S FUTURE
What of the future of Formosa and the ultimate destiny of over 14
million people? What role or responsibility does the United States have in this
issue? The question that arises here is that of our moral obligation to the
Formosans, if any. Or, what should our responsibility be, professing adher-
ence to the principle of self-determination of peoples, while at the same time
defending under treaty a government denying much of this self-determination;
a government we have economically and militarily supported for over twenty
years. In addition, the resentment toward our Vietnam intervention (also in
the cause of self-determination) has combined with other factors to put this
country in a mood for pulling back, not increasing, our commitments on a
distant Asian island.
Robert Scalapino aptly described Formosa as a living symbol of the
great American dilemma. Put in simple and straightforward terms, that
dilemma is how to fulfill the awesome responsibilities of being a global power,
entrusted with the defense of many societies, and at the same time, remain
57
faithful to the principles that constitute our political-ethical creed.
In President Nixon's State of the World message of February 9, 1972,




not a matter for the United States to decide . . . . " In the joint Shanghai
communique' of February 27, 1972, he stated:
The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either
side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China
and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Gov-
ernment does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its
interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by
the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it
affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U. S.
forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the
meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and
military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area
diminishes.
Unfortunately, the question of what we should do about the native
Formosan and his future holds very low priority compared to questions of
United States relations with Communist China or the Chinese Nationalist Gov-
ernment. To better view possible courses of action for solving this problem I
would like to examine some of the available alternatives.
First, what of the defense treaty between the United States and the
Nationalists? This treaty has defended Taiwan and the off-shore islands
against agression for nineteen years. During this time Taipei has been equipped
with an impressive array of defensive weapons and training. Thus, it could be
contended that the purposes of the 19 54 accord have been met, in that the
defense of the Republic of China for this period has more than given them time
to prepare themselves against a Communist attack.
Most of the 8, 800 American forces on Taiwan are personnel who were
involved in support of the Vietnam war. They will be reduced as the peace is
firmly secured, leaving the 400 military personnel assigned to the Taiwan
Defense Command and the Military Assistance Advisory Group.
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These are also being reduced in number.
It might appear to be the formal position of the People's Republic of
China that all American forces must be withdrawn from Taiwan before more
normal relations between Washington and Peking can really take place. Peking,
however, doesn't appear to be demanding formal abrogation of America's
defense treaty with Taiwan. Premier Chou told James Preston of The New York
Times that when all U. S. troops leave Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits area,
"then as a matter of course, the so-called U. S. -Chiang mutual-defense treaty,
which we had all along considered to be illegal, would become invalid. " °
What are other alternatives to the China-Formosa scenario? Some
writers, including the late Edgar Snow, have proposed that Chiang's son,
Ching-kuo, might negotiate to turn Formosa over to the mainland Communists
59
rather than see it evolve as an independent nation under Formosan rule.
Premier Chou En-lai has publicly renounced the use of force against Taiwan,
saying that there are other ways of solving the problem. This implies negotia-
tions with the Kuomintang government. However, while Chiang lives, there
will probably be no deal with China. This was clearly evident in his October 26,
1971 message to "my fellow countrymen at home and abroad. " He spoke of






Nationalist bastion of Taiwan, the failures of the "Mao' Tse-tung bandit
regime, " and then pledged that "we (shall) cross over to the other shore,
finliberate our compatriots and recover our lost mainland. "
Another more radical alternative has been suggested by other
writers; If Taiwan and the defense treaty were abandoned by the United States,
it still might obtain protection from another quarter, the Soviet Union. Though
never mentioned publicly by any of the governments involved, this possibility
may well be playing a role in their policy deliberations. G. F. Hudson, former
Director of Far Eastern Studies, Oxford, suggests that with the death of Chiang
Kai-shek, his son is in a good position to take Taiwan along a new road should
President Nixon deem it expedient to rid himself of America's commitment.
A price would have to be paid for Soviet protection, of course, but rather than
curbing Taiwan's flourishing capitalist economy, it would be primarily strategic.
As long as the USSR aspires to be a great world naval power and remains at
odds with the People's Republic, the use of sea and air bases on an island
approximately halfway between Vladivostok and Singapore and 100 miles from
the coast of South China would certainly be an attractive proposition. Conversely,
it would threaten Peking far more than the U. S. presence in the area, for it
would complete the encirclement of China by a power that already presses on
her land borders to the north and west- -a power that shows no sign of adopting
in Asia the "low profile" policy to which the U. S. is now committed. 61
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It may be that Peking could reach an understanding with Moscow that
would exclude any future Russian support for Taipei, but only at a price that
the present Communist Chinese leadership would be unwilling to pay. As
matters stand now, the continuing tension between the People's Republic and





After examining some of the alternatives for a solution to the
Formosan dilemma, I would like to conclude with an additional one directed at
an ultimate settlement in which the people are fully and effectively represented.
It would appear more plausible at this time for the Nationalist
Government to reach an amiable accord with the Formosan majority and increase
their participation in a continuing effort toward further political representation.
This would avoid an internal split which neither group can hardly afford, and
unite the country against further pressure from a Mainland China unification
effort.
No one can speak with certainty about what is in the minds of the
Formosans. The politically repressive Chiang regime has not until recently
permitted them to speak their minds. But, as best one can judge, the vast
majority appear to yearn for a Taiwan separate from China and a government
they themselves control. The increase in political participation by the younger
Formosans coupled with the passing of the older mainlanders appears to be
providing a stage where the native Formosans will more and more perform
their active role in government and self-determination.
Most Asian scholars in 1973 do not see a readily viable solution to
this problem through the United Nations. Professor Urban Whitaker of San
Francisco State College who made a detailed study of the United Nations
delegates' views states: "The role of the United Nations is likely to be mini-




It is my contention that this is an extremely crucial time in which we
should not abrogate our responsibility to the people of Formosa and completely
ignore their aspirations for political identity, or to advocate renunciation of
our 19 54 mutual defense treaty. Providing that we do not desire to engage in
further projection of our own traditions of self-determination, in Asia, we
still cannot wash our hands of the matter. John K. Fairbank, Director of the
Eastern Asian Research Center at Harvard, has stated that:
. . . Until some successor situation has been worked out
among the Chinese parties in some fashion, there is a
strong moral argument against our renouncing the mutual
security treaty. To do so before that time would undoubtedly
produce insecurity, uncertainty, and trouble. The existence
of the treaty is a sort of guarantee that the Chinese arrange-
ments concerning Taiwan will not be made by force . . . °3
It is not within the scope of this study of Formosan nationalism to
attempt to solve the volatile issue of the future status of relations between the
Republic of China and Communist China. Whether there ultimately will be
"one China"; "one China, one Formosa"; or "two Chinas" is a problem that
must be resolved by the two governments involved, not by a formula written in
Washington. In this regard, I do not feel the principles of the 1972 Shanghai
communique' are valid. The concept that "all Chinese on either side of the
Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of
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that this may well be the view of the two governments involved, but it is not
the view of the majority of the Formosan people. Nor can a joint communique'
signed by two political leaders foreclose this issue. Professor Edwin O.
Reischauer of Harvard has stated that:
The Shanghai communique' has in fact guaranteed the
continuation of the status quo for some time, thus further
strengthening the separateness of the Taiwanese from
China. It may also force the Formosan majority and the
mainland minority into a closer union.
Americans should not assume that the Taiwan problem is
solved or on the way to solution. 'Autonomy' might serve
for a while as a useful fig leaf term to conceal the realities
but it is not a solution. Peking and the Taiwanese could
never agree on a common interpretation of autonomy. 64
If the ultimate answer does lie in an independent Formosa, perhaps
the orchestration of the recent summit style meetings between Communist
China, Japan, the United States and the Soviet Union might provide a vehicle
to reduce our military forces and eventually terminate our defense treaty in
return for the assurance that non-intervention and sovereignty of Taiwan will
be recognized. If the majority of the Formosans do not want this separate
political identity, they should have some means to express their will, through
a mandate offered by the existing Chiang government or its successor.
A separate Formosa may well elect to negotiate economic and travel
agreements with Communist China, resulting in the return of those on Taiwan
preferring to join their families on the mainland. In addition, United Nations
Edwin O. Reischauer, "VJhat the Taiwanese Really Feel," WeW Vohk
T-on&S, March 20, 1972, p. 11.

37
membership should present no great problem if approached from the stand-
point of a separate Formosan (or Republic of China) state and not the previous
Chiang Kai-shek claim to representation of the mainland.
Finally, I see no reason why the existing Formosan nationalism that
has been the basis of this study cannot be the primary catalyst to bring about
the realization of a government that truly represents its people in an inter-
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